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I. INTRODUCTION
Of William Mitchell’s contributions to the life of the law in
America, James Bradley Thayer could write in 1900: “On no court
in the country to-day is there a judge who would not find his peer
in Judge Mitchell. That he has been considered in the highest
circles for the bench of the Supreme Court is, I dare say, as known
1
to you as it is to me.” Thayer, professor of law at Harvard and one
of the great legal minds of his time, acknowledged that “I have long

† Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas Law School (Minnesota).
Dr. Reid holds degrees in American law and canon law from the Catholic
University of America and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. This article has its
origin in a talk delivered at William Mitchell College of Law in November 2002.
The author is grateful to his hosts for the warm reception and helpful comments
he received. Any mistakes in this Article are, of course, the author’s responsibility.
1. Edwin James Jaggard, William Mitchell 1832-1900, 8 GREAT AMERICAN
LAWYERS 387, 398 (William Draper Lewis ed., Rothman Reprints 1971) (1909)
(quoting James Bradley Thayer).
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recognized Judge Mitchell as one of the best judges in this
2
country . . . .”
Mitchell, of Scottish ancestry and Canadian birth, arrived in
the United States in 1850 to study at Jefferson (now Washington
3
and Jefferson) College. At college, he received a strongly Calvinist
4
education that emphasized logic and moral grounding. Although
his religious convictions would shift and he eventually abandoned
formal membership in the Presbyterian Church, he remained very
5
much what we would call today a “cultural Puritan.” Significantly,
even after dropping formal affiliation with the Church, Mitchell
6
“taught Bible class at the First Presbyterian Church of Winona.”
Mitchell’s presence graced the Minnesota Supreme Court for
7
nearly nineteen years, from 1881 to 1900. His output was
8
prodigious. He produced nearly 1600 judicial opinions. It has
been estimated “that excluding Sundays, and allowing a month in
each year for vacation, Judge Mitchell wrote one opinion in every
9
three days for nineteen years.” Indeed, “[i]n point of numbers, his
opinions exceed those of any other justice of the Supreme Court of
10
his state, or the nation.” It is one aspect, perhaps the central
aspect, the unifying theme of this prolific body of work, that is the
focus of this essay: William Mitchell’s commitment to the basic
principles and methodology of common-law jurisprudence.
II. W ILLIAM MITCHELL: HIS COMMON-LAW
JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTEXT
William Mitchell’s career coincided with the period of the
greatest flourishing of the common law in American legal history.
In whichever direction one turned, one was likely to encounter a
great commentator on the common law or a great judge working
2. Id.
3. Id. at 387.
4. Id. at 388. “The college facilities were limited. Its curriculum was narrow; its
atmosphere surcharged with the Calvinism of the ‘unspeakable Scot’ [John Knox];
but the mental drill was exacting and thorough; the moral discipline severe and
exalting.” Id.
5. See id. at 395-96. As his biographer put it: “His Scotch loyalty preserved his
association with the Presbyterians . . . .” Id.
6. Justice William Mitchell: A Centennial Tribute, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5, 10
(1981).
7. Id. at 11-13.
8. See Jaggard, supra note 1, at 426.
9. Id. at 425.
10. Id. at 427.
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within that tradition. There was Joel Prentiss Bishop, author of
multiple treatises on various aspects of the common law, who was
11
perhaps the greatest of the nineteenth-century treatise writers. In
his own day, Bishop was probably at least as influential, where the
broad mass of practitioners was concerned, as Oliver Wendell
12
Holmes. There was James Coolidge Carter, who “was perhaps the
13
most respected appellate advocate in the nation.”
“As a
jurisprudential writer, Carter was the preeminent American
14
champion of historical jurisprudence . . . ,” upon which he drew
to advocate on behalf of the singular importance of an unwritten,
evolving common law to the development of the American legal
15
order.
There was also Thomas Cooley, another of the great treatise
writers of the day and a leading judge. His treatise on
constitutional limitations, G. Edward White has observed, provided
an important intellectual support for the growth of theories of
substantive due process, though Cooley shied away from such
16
general terminology. There was Charles Schuster Zane, the Chief
Justice of the Utah Territorial Supreme Court, who is considered
17
even today to be the founder of Utah law. There was also Charles
Zane’s son, John Maxcy Zane, another notable treatise-writer and
commentator on the law, as well as prominent Utah and Chicago
18
lawyer.
This whole way of thinking about the law was still in full vigor
in the early years of the twentieth century. Benjamin Cardozo, in
many respects, represents its final flowering. An opinion like
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. is an outstanding example of his deft
11. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 215
(1995).
12. See id. at 217. Siegel has written: “Bishop may be more representative of the
mass of nineteenth-century middle-class lawyers than the [elites of the Harvard Law
School faculty].” Id.
13. Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW
& HIST. REV. 577, 578 (2002).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 579.
16. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 118-19 (New York: Oxford University Press 1976) (referring to T.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 355 (1868)).
17. See Thomas G. Alexander, Charles S. Zane: Apostle of the New Era, 34 UTAH
HIST. Q. 290 (1966); John Maxcy Zane, A Rare Judicial Service: Charles S. Zane, 19 J. ILL.
STATE HIST. SOC’ Y. 31 (1926).
18. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Foreword to JOHN M AXCY ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW, ix,
ix-xxii (2d ed. 1998).
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use of precedent within the common-law framework. Cardozo’s
view of the role of the common-law judge as artist is a view that
would have resonated with nineteenth-century judges like William
Mitchell.
Now, what were the main premises of this common-law
tradition? Its jurisprudence, as already intimated, can best be
described by the term “historical jurisprudence.” The term
“historical jurisprudence” itself is no longer much in use, although
we still employ the fruits of this method of reasoning when we have
recourse to the doctrine of precedent, or employ such metaphors
as the evolution, or growth, or development of legal doctrines from
certain principles. It does well to bear in mind that not every legal
order perceives law as an evolutionary enterprise. That we tend to
use such terms unreflectively, almost as second nature, is testimony
to the hold that historical jurisprudence has over us still.
In its origins, this way of viewing the law can be traced to
seventeenth-century England and the thought-world of the great
English common lawyers, Sir Edward Coke, Sir John Selden, and
20
Sir Matthew Hale.
These English lawyers were believers in a natural law—a
transcendent law ultimately of divine origin which established
norms of right and wrong and governed the affairs of nations.
Matthew Hale thus saw the hand of providence in human affairs,
“to the point where a falling stone or a parish boundary were seen
21
to manifest the will of God.” They also believed in a positive law,
the statute-law of the temporal realm, valid by reason of enactment
22
by king and parliament. Thus Matthew Hale included among the
sources of law “[t]he authority of Parliament to make law,” and
23
“[t]he judicial decisions of courts of justice.”
But these English lawyers also believed, in a way that their
predecessors had not, in a way, I fear, that we sometimes do not, in
19. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). Justice Cardozo used precedent to determine
that an automobile company had a strict duty with respect to faulty wheels purchased
from a third party company due to the nature of the business. Id.
20. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,
103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1993).
21. ALAN CROMARTIE, SIR M ATTHEW HALE, 1609-1676: LAW, RELIGION, AND
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 235 (1995). For examples of how this view of providence
affected his judging, see generally Maija Jannson, Matthew Hale on Judges and Judging, 9 J.
LEGAL HIST. 201 (1988) (reprinting portions of Matthew Hale’s diary).
22. See Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1720-21.
23. JOHN HOSTETTLER, THE RED GOWN: THE LIFE AND WORKS OF SIR M ATTHEW
HALE 190 (2002).
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24

the normative significance of the past. Historical jurisprudence,
on this account, is the recognition that law is the product, at least
in part, of the distinct historical experiences of the political
community. The distinctive history of nations and peoples
conditioned the sorts of law each nation would have. Society, as
Edmund Burke observed, was a covenant among the generations—
25
the past, the present, and those generations yet unborn. Law,
continuous over time, faithful to first principles, reflective of the
received wisdom of the ages, was the bond that held the
26
generations together.
The English common law, on this analysis, was the product of
27
the distinct historical experiences of the English people. Its
existence, at least to the common lawyers who gave it shape and
substance, was seen as a gradual, almost providential, unfolding of
history. England, seen as a kind of chosen people, was thus
understood by English jurisprudes as blessed with a legal order that
28
fitted its needs as a free and commercial people.
The three greatest historical jurisprudes of the seventeenth
century, the three lawyers responsible for the development of this
conceptual apparatus—Coke, Selden, and Hale—understood the
legal reasoning that accompanied this legal order as a type of
“artificial reason,” by which they meant not that it was in some way
false or merely pretence, but rather that it was the product of art—
29
the result of human handiwork.
And this handiwork was
necessarily historical. As Sir Edward Coke wrote:
[R]eason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself
is nothing else but reason; which is to be understood of an
artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study,
observation and experience, and not of every man’s
natural reason; for Nemo nascitur artifex. This legal reason
est summa ratio. And therefore if all the reason that is
dispersed into so many several heads were united into
24. See Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1655.
25. See Bruce P. Frohnen, Multicultural Rights? Natural Law and the Reconciliation
of Universal Norms With Particular Cultures, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 39, 59-60 (2002) (citing
EDMUND BURKE, Essay Towards a History of the Laws of England, in 6 THE WORKS OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 413, 416 (Bohn ed. 1854)).
26. Id. at 60.
27. See Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1733.
28. Id. at 1722.
29. Id. at 1689. Cf. Charles Gray, Reason, Authority, and Imagination: The
Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke, in CULTURE AND POLITICS FROM PURITANISM TO THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 25, 30-31 (Perez Zagorin ed. 1980).
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one, yet could he not make such a law as the law of
England is; because by many succession of ages it hath
been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave
and learned men, and by long experience grown to such a
perfection for the government of this realm, as the old
rule may be justly verified of it, Neminem oportet esse
sapientiorem legibus: No man out of his own private reason
ought to
be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of
30
reason.
The best of the English lawyers appreciated that the common
law was not unchanging. But, they argued, it evolved in a way that
31
was faithful to its first premises. Thus, for instance, Sir Matthew
Hale could write:
[T]hough those particular variations and accessions have
happened in the laws, yet they being only partial and
successive, we may with just reason say, they are the same
English laws now, that they were 600 Years since in the
general . . . [just] as Titius is the same man he was 40 years
since, though physicians tell us, that in a tract of seven
years, the body has scarce
any of the same material
32
substance it had before.
The method the English common lawyers employed to analyze
the law—it seems almost uniquely adapted to a historical view of
legal development—was the doctrine of precedent. We who work
within the common-law tradition take the doctrine of precedent for
granted. It would come as a surprise, I think, to most American
legal scholars to realize that most European systems have
traditionally lacked a strong notion of precedent. To be sure, the
33
French rely upon jurisprudence—the “teaching” of the courts, while
the courts of canon law in Rome look to stylus or praxis—the settled
34
practice of the courts. But reliance on teaching and customary
practice does not constitute reasoning by precedent in the fashion

30. Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority, and Will”: Sir Edmund Coke and the
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 44 (1997) (quoting SIR EDWARD
COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 97b (Charles A. Butler ed., Legal Classics Library
1985) (1628)).
31. Berman, Origins, supra note 20, at 1713.
32. Id. (quoting M ATHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND 40 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (3d ed. 1739) (spelling modernized)).
33. See André Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459,
462-68 (1976).
34. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND M ARRIAGES IN THE
COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA 27 (1972).
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that is practiced within the Anglo-American tradition.
In fact, by the seventeenth century, the English lawyers had
come to make use of a theory of precedent that historians now call
35
“traditionary.” In operation, this doctrine of precedent bore
greater resemblance to its Continental counterparts than to the
strict doctrine of precedent that rose to prominence in the
36
nineteenth century and in modified form remains with us today.
“[P]erhaps the first recorded use of the term ‘precedent’”
occurred in 1557, in a case where “it was said that judgment was
37
given ‘notwithstanding two presidents.’” In 1673, a little more
than one hundred years later, one sees Chief Justice John Vaughan
of the Court of Common Pleas distinguish between the court’s
holding and sayings of the Court that were extraneous, which
38
Vaughan labeled “gratis dictum.” It is the holding that we should
be concerned with identifying, Vaughan admonished his readers,
39
and dicta which we are free to ignore.
Until about the year 1800, however, it was not, as Lord
Mansfield put it in 1762, “the letter of particular precedents” that
40
made law, but “[t]he reason and spirit of cases.” The judge, on
this analysis, remained responsible for discerning whether prior
case law was sound, reasonable, and congruent with the first
41
principles of the legal order.
Gradually, however, with the dissemination and triumph of
theories of legal positivism, made popular in the first third of the
nineteenth century by scholars like John Austin and Jeremy
Bentham, a strict doctrine of precedent became an intellectually
42
coherent possibility.
The strict doctrine, as any first-year law
student knows, looks to whether a particular precedent is “on all
43
fours” with the present case. Where such a match could be
identified, the court is bound by the principle of stare decisis and is
35. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal
Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 449 (1996); H. Jefferson Powell,
The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 969 (1993).
36. See Berman & Reid, supra note 35, at 449; Powell, supra note 35, at 969-71.
37. See Berman & Reid, supra note 35, at 446 (quoting CARLETON KEMP ALLEN ,
LAW IN THE M AKING 204 (7th ed. 1964)).
38. Id. at 447 (quoting Bole v. Horton, 124 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1124 (K.B. 1673)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 449 (quoting Fisher v. Prince, 97 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (K.B. 1762)).
41. See Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of the Notion of Our Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN
LAW 9, 16-17 (Laurence Goldstein ed. 1987).
42. See Berman & Reid, supra note 35, at 449, 514-15.
43. Id. at 514.
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44

not free to vary from the prior holding.
The common-law system of reasoning, with its reliance on
historical tradition and on precedent—in both its traditionary and
more modern epiphanies—was intended to promote adaptive
change within the boundaries of established prior opinions. James
Coolidge Carter, for instance, argued on behalf of the creative role
of precedent by pointing to the “condition of constant change” that
45
characterizes the “complicated societies” of his day. It is better,
Carter argued, that courts, not legislatures, take the lead in the
reform of the law, since courts have the tradition of the common
law upon which to draw, and can thus render decisions in accord
with the traditions of the country and narrowly tailored to meet
46
social needs.
It thus belonged to the common-law judge, Carter asserted,
taking account of precedent, looking to “the ordinary ways in
which the business, the intercourse, and the conduct of life are
conducted,” “to find the best rule by which the case may be
47
determined.” Carter’s emphasis of the words “find” and “best”
indicated the creative role he expected the judge to play. Like Sir
Edward Coke, like Sir Matthew Hale, Carter expected his judge to
have long experience in the law and to be able to employ its
principles creatively, adaptively, and faithfully, when confronted
48
with novel questions and circumstances. This was the thoughtworld in which William Mitchell moved and the vision of the
common law that we can safely say he endorsed.
III. JUSTICE W ILLIAM MITCHELL: THE CREATIVE
USE OF COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES
With this as background, we can now consider the tradition
and the thought-world within which Justice Mitchell operated, and
the ways in which that thought-world influenced his own work as a
judge. His position as a prolific justice on the Supreme Court of a
state only recently admitted to the Union at the time of his
elevation to the bench conferred on him exceptional latitude in
looking to the whole of the common-law tradition for guidance.
44.
45.
(1907).
46.
47.
48.

Id.
JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH,

AND

FUNCTION 172

Id.
Id.
Id.
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But his work, it seems clear, remained entirely within that tradition.
While he utilized the tradition creatively in fashioning solutions for
pressing legal problems, he did not feel himself free to break its
bonds.
A. The Historical Grounding of Justice Mitchell’s Common Law
Jurisprudence
Like the best writers in the tradition of the common law and
historical jurisprudence, Justice Mitchell recognized both the
necessity that common-law reasoning be historically grounded and
the possibility that common-law principles were capable of
expansion, modification, and growth. Writing in dissent in Cigar
Makers Protective Union v. Conhaim, Mitchell declared: “[I]t is one of
the chief excellencies of the common law that its principles are
49
capable of application to new conditions as they arise . . . .” And
in National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co., Mitchell asserted that
the common-law teaching on contracts in restraint of trade had to
be understood historically:
Formerly in England the courts frowned with great
severity upon every contract [in restraint of trade]. The
reasons for this partly grew out of the English law of
apprenticeship, by which, in its original severity, no
person could exercise any regular trade or handicraft
except after having served a long apprenticeship . . . .
Hence, if a person was prevented from pursuing his
particular trade, he was practically deprived of all means
of earning a livelihood, and the state was deprived of his
services. No such reason now obtains in this country,
where every citizen is at liberty to change his occupation
at will. Moreover, as cheaper and more rapid facilities for
travel and transportation gradually changed the manner
of doing business, so as to enable parties to conduct it
over a vastly greater territory than formerly, the courts
were necessarily compelled to readjust the test or standard
of the reasonableness of restrictions as to place. And
again, modern investigations have much modified the
views of courts as well as political economists as to the
effect of contracts tending to reduce the number of
competitors in any particular line of business. Excessive
competition is not now . . . necessarily conducive to the
49.

40 Minn. 243, 248, 41 N.W. 943, 946 (1889) (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
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public good. The fact is that the early common-law
doctrine in regard to contracts in restraint of trade largely
grew out of a state of society and of business which has
ceased to exist, and hence the doctrine has been much
modified, as will be seen by comparison of the early
English cases with modern decisions,—both English and
American. A contract may be illegal on grounds of public
policy because in restraint of trade, but it is of paramount
public policy
not lightly to interfere with freedom of
50
contract.
Justice Mitchell’s stance on the need to move beyond the
classic formulations of the English common law on restraint of
trade was a controversial position to take in late nineteenth-century
America as many lawyers and policy-makers came to view
monopolistic practices as harmful to the economic interests of
51
substantial portions of the American public. But Justice Mitchell’s
reasoning on behalf of taking a fresh look at the law of contracts in
restraint of trade, given changes in economic circumstance, is of a
piece with the historically grounded reasoning advocated by men
like Carter, or even, classically, Sir Matthew Hale. Fidelity to the
past was important because it served as a starting point for analysis;
but one was not necessarily tied to the decision-making of the past,
52
where the court felt needs of the time demanded something else.
Like other great common-law judges and writers, such as

50. 45 Minn. 272, 275-76, 47 N.W. 806, 807 (1891).
51. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1219-21, 1224-30 (1988). Mitchell’s argument, in fact, anticipates the United
States Supreme Court’s own narrowing of the antitrust statutes through the Rule of
Reason Doctrine. Id. at 1220-21 (explaining the Rule of Reason).
52. At times, however, despite his own misgivings, Justice Mitchell felt
constrained by the common-law rule. Kremer v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway
Co. involved an action to recover possession of a strip of land over which the
defendant Railway apparently laid its track. 54 Minn. at 157, 55 N.W. at 928 (1893).
Plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded damages to compensate for the taking that
had occurred. Id. The railway then moved for a second trial. Id. Mitchell held in
favor of the motion despite serious reservations:
The right to a second trial in actions for the recovery of real
property is a relic of the fictions of the old common-law action of
ejectment, which had their foundation, in part, at least, in the old
feudal idea that the title to real property is too sacred to be
concluded by the result of one trial, or even one action, which, in
my judgment, has no justification for its continued existence . . . .
But we see no way of preventing this under the statute as it now
exists.
Id. at 161, 55 N.W. at 929.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/13

10

Reid: The Creativity of the Common-Law Judge: The Jurisprudence of Will
REID_A UG.10_READYFORFINALPROOF.DOC

2003]

JURISPRUDENCE OF WILLIAM MITCHELL

9/15/2003 5:37 PM

223

Cooley, Carter, and Cardozo, Mitchell understood that the
common law was not a static and unchanging body of rules.
We recognize the fact that the common law is not a code
of cast-iron rules, but a system of principles capable of
being applied to new conditions as they arise; and when a
case arises which falls within a recognized legal principle
the fact that it is new in instance will not and ought not
to
53
stand in the way of the courts applying the principle.
But this case also illustrates the limits which Justice Mitchell
was willing to place upon common-law creativity. A husband had
separated from his wife, but subsequently wrote to her seeking a
54
reconciliation.
Western Union failed to convey the wife’s
affirmative reply in a timely fashion and the man sued for the
55
mental distress this delay caused him.
Mitchell conceded that telegraphs presented a novel form of
communication and that Western Union did, indeed, cause the
56
plaintiff to suffer acute distress. But the allowance of a cause of
action for mental distress seemed too large a departure from the
57
common-law tradition to countenance. Courts were not really
free to violate common-law principles:
Courts have no more right thus to abrogate the common
law than they have to repeal the statutory law. The
principles of the common law were founded upon
practical reasons, and not upon a theoretical logical
system; and usually, when these principles have been
departed from, the evil consequences of the departure
have developed what these reasons were. The truth is,
once depart from the old rule, and58 we are all at sea,
without either rudder or compass.
Mitchell had no desire to create a rule “allowing damages for
mental suffering resulting from the nondelivery of a telegraph
59
message.”
Texas had established such a rule and the Texas
60
decision opened a “vast field of speculative litigation.” Mitchell’s
fear of judicial mischief was too strong to permit him to subject the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 265, 59 N.W. 1078, 1081 (1894).
Id. at 258, 59 N.W. at 1078.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262, 59 N.W. at 1080 (citation omitted).
Id. at 263, 59 N.W. at 1080 (citing So Relle v. Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881)).
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Minnesota courts to the same kind of speculative traffic.
Reading these cases together, Justice Mitchell can be seen to
favor development of law faithful to the first principles of the
common law; but too great a departure from principles amounted
to a radical break and could not be allowed. Where to draw the
line was, for Mitchell, as it would have been for his seventeenthcentury predecessors, a matter of art, and long exposure to the
“artificial reason” of the law.
B. Common-Law Reasoning and Fundamental Rights
In a day before the emergence of modern constitutional law
and the application by means of the incorporation doctrine of the
Bill of Rights to the states, a judge like Mitchell tended to look to
the common law as a source of rights of the citizen against the
state.
Bardwell v. Anderson involved a challenge to a Minnesota statute
permitting service by publication in lieu of personal service in cases
involving the foreclosure of real estate mortgages and the
61
enforcement of mechanics’ liens. In considering the validity of
the challenge, Mitchell began with the common law:
Suffice it to say that, from the earliest days of the territory
down at least to 1866, such substituted service [service by
publication] in actions strictly judicial in their nature, and
proceeding according to the course of the common law,
was only allowed where the defendant could not be found
within the state; personal service being, in accordance
with the uniform rule and practice from time
immemorial, required in all cases where the defendant
could be found, and service
made upon him, within the
62
jurisdiction of the court.
Mitchell focused in particular on the question of “whether it is
competent for the legislature to authorize such service in such
actions upon residents of the state personally present, and capable
63
of being found, and personally served, within its jurisdiction.” He
responded by looking in particular to the definitions of the term
and concept “due process of law,” as developed by the common law
64
tradition.
61.
62.
63.
64.

44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315 (1890).
Id. at 98, 46 N.W. at 316.
Id. at 101, 46 N.W. at 317.
Id. at 101-04, 46 N.W. at 317-18.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/13

12

Reid: The Creativity of the Common-Law Judge: The Jurisprudence of Will
REID_A UG.10_READYFORFINALPROOF.DOC

2003]

JURISPRUDENCE OF WILLIAM MITCHELL

9/15/2003 5:37 PM

225

Mitchell looked to the argument of Daniel Webster in the
Dartmouth College case for his definition of due process: “The
general law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
65
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.”
With this
declaration as his guiding principle, Mitchell considered the types
66
of action where personal notice was and was not required.
Personal service was not required in actions in rem, such as suits in
67
admiralty. In such cases, “the process of the court goes against
the thing which is in the custody of the court, and technically the
68
defendant.”
There was also a second class of cases, such as
probate, or “the exercise of the right of eminent domain, [or] the
69
exercise of the power of taxation,” where “personal notice to
persons interested in the subject or object of the proceedings has
70
never been deemed necessary.”
But actions in personam, which included actions to foreclose on
mortgages, historically received different treatment by the common
71
law. In these cases, Mitchell asserted:
[F]rom the earliest period of English jurisprudence down
to the present, as well as in the jurisprudence of the
United States derived from that of England, it has always
been considered a cardinal and fundamental principle
that in actions in personam proceeding according to the
course of the common law, personal service (or its
equivalent, as by leaving a copy at his usual place of
abode) of the writ, process or summons must be made on
all defendants resident72 and to be found within the
jurisdiction of the court.
This did not mean that various forms of constructive service
were never possible, but “that the right to resort to such
constructive or substituted service in personal actions proceeding
according to the course of the common law rests upon the
necessities of the case, and has always been limited and restricted to
73
cases where personal service could not be made.”
65. Id. at 101-02, 46 N.W. at 317 (quoting Daniel Webster, argument of counsel,
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 581 (1819)).
66. Id. at 102, 46 N.W. at 317.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 103, 46 N.W. at 318.
72. Id. at 103, 46 N.W. at 317.
73. Id. at 103, 46 N.W. at 318.
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In this way, Mitchell used the ancient rights conferred by the
common law as a means of restricting the power of the legislature.
“Although the legislature may at its pleasure provide new remedies
or change old ones, the power is nevertheless subject to the
condition that it cannot remove certain ancient landmarks, or take
away certain fundamental rights which have been always recognized
74
and observed in judicial procedures.” The common law itself thus
became, at the hands of an expert practitioner like Mitchell, the
source of rights that the positive legislative acts of a legislature
could not contravene.
C. Trial By Jury and Judicial Restraint
Mitchell not only used the categories of the common law as a
means of restraining legislative power, he used it as a means of
restraining the power of the courts as well. Lommen v. Minneapolis
Gaslight Co. involved a challenge to a statute establishing the
ground rules by which a “struck” or special jury might be
75
constituted. The adoption of the struck jury in a large number of
states in nineteenth-century America was in emulation of English
76
reforms of the eighteenth century. English statutes of the early
eighteenth century treated the terms “special jury” and “struck
77
jury” as synonymous.
The term “struck jury” came into use in England because of
the method employed in assembling the jury: “[T]he formation
procedure, allowing each party to strike twelve prospective jurors
from a panel of forty-eight names, was the consistent distinctive
78
characteristic.” The purpose behind the adoption of the struck
jury system in the nineteenth-century United States was to give “the
parties some degree of control over jury composition that they
79
otherwise would not have had.”
The system was typically
80
employed in order to facilitate informed decision-making,
74. Id. at 102, 46 N.W. at 317.
75. 65 Minn. 196, 68 N.W. 53 (1896).
76. The history of the struck or special jury is traced by James Oldham. See
James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (1983); James
C. Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and Its Relation to
Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Challenges, 6
WM. & M ARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (1998).
77. Oldham, Origins, supra note 76, at 176.
78. Id.
79. Oldham, History, supra note 76, at 652.
80. See id. at 671.
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although it has come under fire today because it can frustrate the
goal of assembling a jury that reflects a cross-section of the
community, thereby enhancing the possibility that racial animus
81
might play a role in jury composition.
The Minnesota statute at issue reflected English practice and
was typical of many of the statutes of its day. Parties to litigation
were empowered to make a demand for a special jury with the clerk
82
of courts, the sheriff was then required to assemble forty persons
judged by the sheriff to be the “most indifferent between the
83
parties, and the best qualified to try such issue,” the parties
84
themselves were then allowed to strike twelve names each, and the
jury would consist of the first twelve of the sixteen remaining
85
persons to appear at the courthouse. The statute was challenged
as being in violation of the state constitution, as impermissible
“class legislation . . . unequal in its operation,” and as “contrary to
86
the American system of jury trial . . . .”
Mitchell commenced his analysis of the statute by articulating
a powerful defense of judicial restraint:
Inasmuch as the legislature is a co-ordinate branch of the
government, the courts do not sit to review or revise their
legislative action; and hence, if they hold an act invalid, it
must be because the legislature has failed to keep within
its constitutional limits. A court has no right to declare an
act invalid solely on the ground of unjust or oppressive
provisions, or because it is supposed to violate the natural,
social, or political rights of the citizen, unless it can be
shown that such injustice is prohibited or87such rights
guarantied or protected by the constitution.
But even though Mitchell decided the case on constitutional
grounds, he nevertheless looked to the common law in order to
give content to the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury. “What
88
is ‘trial by jury’ to which the constitution refers?” Mitchell asked.
“The expression ‘trial by jury,’” Mitchell continued, “is as old as
Magna Charta, and has obtained a definite historical meaning,
81.
82.
(1896).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 671-75.
See Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 206, 68 N.W. 53, 53
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207, 68 N.W. at 53.
Id. at 207, 68 N.W. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 209, 68 N.W. at 55.
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which is well understood by all English-speaking peoples; and, for
that reason, no American constitution has ever assumed to define
89
it. We are therefore relegated to the history of the common law.”
Reviewing the history of the jury, Mitchell found three
elements to be absolute: “The essential and substantive attributes
or elements of jury trial are and always have been number,
impartiality, and unanimity. The jury must consist of 12; they must
be impartial and indifferent between the parties; and their verdict
90
must be unanimous.” These characteristics were themselves fixed
by the common law.
The statute in question cannot be said, Mitchell observed, to
91
violate either the requirement of number or unanimity. If the
92
struck jury violated any of these elements, it must be impartiality.
Impartiality, Mitchell noted, might be implicated by two aspects of
the statute: the possibility that the sheriff may wish to “pack” the
93
jury; and the absence of a procedure for lodging peremptory
94
challenges, aside from the procedure for striking jurors.
Mitchell answered these concerns through an appeal to the
history of the common law. In fact, Mitchell noted, struck juries
have their origin not in a desire to pack jury panels but to ensure
impartiality: “The main object of special juries was protection
95
against packed or incompetent common juries.”
England,
furthermore, even at the time Mitchell wrote, did not recognize
96
peremptory challenges. Neither element, therefore, seemed
essential to ensure impartiality.
Furthermore, Mitchell observed, many of the states of the
Union have employed special juries. “[T]he Middle and Southern
states seem generally to have recognized special juries as an
existing common-law institution, and to have commenced to
97
regulate it by statute at an early day.” New York thus adopted the
98
special jury in 1801 and Georgia in 1799. Mitchell asserted:
Under all of these statutes . . . the method of selecting the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 210, 68 N.W. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 211, 68 N.W. at 55.
Id. at 212, 68 N.W. at 55.
Id. at 211, 68 N.W. at 55.
Id. at 212, 68 N.W. at 56.
Id. at 212-13, 68 N.W. at 56.
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jury was, in all essential particulars, the same as under our
statute, and as at common law in England. Most, if not all,
of these statutes, were enacted in the several states after
the adoption of their constitutions, containing the same
or similar provisions as to the right of the trial by jury
which are contained in the constitution of Minnesota; and
yet, until the present case, the constitutionality of these
statutes has never, so far as we can discover, been even
questioned, except once . . . . Struck or special juries, and
the present mode of selecting them, had been known to
and recognized by the law, as being in accordance with
the common-law right of trial by jury, for ages before the
adoption of the constitution of this state. It is rather late
in the day to discover the unconstitutionality of such acts;
and it would certainly require great temerity for courts
now to assume to have discovered
some new ground on
99
which to hold them invalid.
Mitchell concluded by agreeing with counsel that the struck
jury presented the occasion for abuse, but responded by returning
to the theme of judicial restraint:
Counsel has much to say about abuses that have grown up
by reason of collusion between dishonest litigants and
friendly or corrupt sheriffs; but, if such abuses have grown
up, this is an argument to address to the legislature,
rather than to the courts. All laws 100
are subject to be
abused by corrupt and dishonest men.
Mitchell thus concluded where he had commenced: the
proper spheres of competence of legislature and judiciary. In
between, he sketched out in magnificent detail the common-law
foundations of the right to trial by jury, identifying in the process
the three inalienable elements: number, impartiality, unanimity.
Provided these elements were preserved, he was willing to allow the
legislature to regulate the details. So much had been allowed in
England, and so much would be permitted in Minnesota.
D. Sunday Closing Laws
Sunday closing laws were a feature of American law almost
from the beginning of English colonial efforts in the New World.
Seventeenth-century English sabbatarian legislation generally
99.
100.

Id. at 214, 68 N.W. at 56-57.
Id. at 215, 68 N.W. at 57.
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101

applied to the colonies as well as to the mother country. The
newly independent states generally reiterated variations of these
legislative schemes and enacted new ones.
From an early date in American legal history, challenges were
raised to such legislation as representing infringements on
102
religious freedom. In upholding the legislation, judges tended to
rely upon overt appeals to Christianity. Commonwealth v. Wolf thus
involved the prosecution of a Jew who observed a Saturday sabbath
and who contended that the Decalogue’s injunction that “six days
shalt thou labor and do all that thou has to do” required him to
103
labor on Sunday.
Purporting to interpret both Christian
commandment and Jewish Talmud, the Court declared that “[i]t is
of the utmost moment . . . that [the people] should be reminded of
104
their religious duties at stated periods.”
The freedom of
conscience guaranteed by the commonwealth’s constitution “was
never intended to shelter those persons, who, out of mere caprice,
would directly oppose those laws for the pleasure of showing their
contempt and abhorrence of the religious opinions of the great
105
mass of the citizens.”
This reasoning was part and parcel of a belief that the
106
Christian religion itself constituted part of the common law. “In
his inaugural address as Dane Professor of Law at Harvard
University, [Joseph] Story elaborated on this claim: ‘One of the
beautiful boasts of our municipal jurisprudence is, that Christianity
is a part of the common law, from which it seeks the sanctions of its

101. See Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L. REV. 675,
682-83 (2000). See also WINTON U. SOLBERG, REDEEM THE TIME: THE PURITAN SABBATH
IN EARLY AMERICA (1977).
The new doctrine of the Sabbath which emerged in England at
the turn of the seventeenth century was influential throughout
various strata of society at the time the colonization of America
began. Englishmen carried the theory to all the original American
settlements, and the growth of Sabbatarianism in many different
geographical areas and social structures demonstrated the
powerful force of Puritan ideology in molding early American
culture.
Id. at 85.
102. King, supra note 101, at 688-97.
103. 3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 50 (Pa. 1817).
104. Id. at 51.
105. Id.
106. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Religious Conscience and the State in U.S.
Constitutional Law, 1789-2001, in RELIGION RETURNS TO THE PUBLIC SQUARE: FAITH AND
POLICY IN AMERICA 63, 68-69 (Hugh Heclo & Wilfred M. McClay eds., 2003).
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rights, and by which it endeavors to regulate its doctrines.’”
Nineteenth-century claims that Christianity constituted a part
of the common law were advanced for a variety of reasons. Story
“located Christianity as ‘lying at [the] foundations’ of the common
law,” and viewed the relationship as essential for protecting the
108
sanctity of oaths and contracts.
Daniel Webster asserted that
“general, tolerant Christianity, is the law of the land,” by which he
meant it was the common repository of moral guidance for the
109
broad mass of the people. Only after the Civil War, in 1868, did a
judicial opinion challenge the maxim that Christianity was a part of
the common law by pointing out that it “[was] a relic of the time
110
when the clergy ruled England . . . . “
The Minnesota statute at issue in State v. Petit seems to have
been part of a general post-Civil-War trend in favor of Sunday
closing laws, justified not so much on strictly religious grounds as
on the public necessity of providing a generally accepted day of
111
rest.
Liberal Protestant writers sought to frame Sabbatarian
arguments in inclusive language, justifying enforced Sunday rest “as
112
a human institution,” beneficial to the growth of culture and the
113
refreshment of the people.
Sunday became a day of
114
“[e]xcursions, rides, and drives,” and general relaxation.
The defendant in State v. Petit was arrested for opening his
barber shop on a Sunday, and challenged the constitutionality of
115
the law. It was, he said, a violation of the state’s police power and
“class legislation,” by which he meant a kind of equal protection
claim: the state had discriminated against barber shops in
specifically directing them to close on Sundays although at the
116
same time allowing for “the works of necessity or charity.” Who
was to say whether a shave and a haircut was not a charitable
107. Id. at 68 (quoting THE M ISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 517
(William W. Story ed. 1852)).
108. Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST.
REV. 27, 49-50 (1998).
109. Id. at 51.
110. Id. at 47 (quoting Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 1, 209 (1868) (Doe, J.,
dissenting)).
111. See ALEXIS M CCROSSEN, HOLY DAY, HOLIDAY: THE AMERICAN SUNDAY 51-78
(2000).
112. Id. at 55.
113. See id. at 55-58.
114. Id. at 79.
115. 74 Minn. 376, 378-79, 77 N.W. 225, 226 (1898).
116. Id.
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enterprise?
Justice Mitchell acknowledged that other jurisdictions had
rested their affirmations of Sunday closing laws on the relationship
of Christianity and the common law: “In some states it has been
held that Christianity is part of the common law of this country,
and Sunday legislation is upheld, in whole or in part, upon that
117
ground.” Mitchell, however, preferred another foundation:
Even if permissible, it is not necessary to resort to any such
reason to sustain such legislation. The ground upon
which such legislation is generally upheld is that it is a
sanitary measure, and as such a legitimate exercise of the
police power. It proceeds upon the theory, entertained by
most of those who have investigated the subject, that the
physical, intellectual, and moral welfare of mankind
requires a periodical day of rest from labor, and, as some
particular day must be fixed, the one most naturally
selected is that which is regarded as sacred by the greatest
number of citizens, and which by custom is generally
devoted to religious worship, or rest and recreation, as
this causes
the least interference with business or existing
118
customs.
Mitchell acknowledged a kind of natural impulse, a
fundamental human necessity, to seek regular time off from one’s
119
labor.
Mitchell thus wrote: “It is sometimes said that mankind
will seek cessation of labor at proper times by the natural
120
influences of the law of self-preservation.”
Mitchell rejected the claim of those who asserted that Sunday
closing laws interfered with the right to work: “Labor is in a great
117. Id. at 379, 77 N.W. at 226.
118. Id.
119. New York Times writer Judith Shulevitz, having recently returned to her Jewish
roots, has written in praise of the Sabbath:
The Israelite Sabbath institutionalized an astonishing, hitherto
undreamed-of notion: that every single creature has the right to
rest, not just the rich and the privileged. Covered under the
Fourth Commandment are women, slaves, strangers and,
improbably, animals. The verse in Deuteronomy that elaborates
on this aspect of the Sabbath repeats, twice, that slaves were not to
work, as if to drive home what must have been very hard to
understand in the ancient world.
Judith Shulevitz, Bring Back the Sabbath, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at 50. Shulevitz
continues: “Do I think everyone else should observe a Sabbath? I believe it would be
good for them, and even better for me, since the more widespread the ritual, the
more likely I am to observe it.” Id.
120. Petit, 74 Minn. at 379, 77 N.W. at 226.
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degree dependent upon capital, and, unless, the exercise of power
which capital affords is restrained, those who are obliged to labor
will not possess the freedom for rest which they would otherwise
121
exercise.”
The Sunday closing laws were thus necessary to protect those
vulnerable to financial pressures:
The object of the law is not so much to protect those who
can rest at pleasure as to afford rest to those who need it,
and who, from the conditions of society, could not
otherwise obtain it. Moreover, if the law was not
obligatory upon all, and those who desired to do so were
permitted to engage in their usual avocation on Sunday,
others engaged in the same kind of labor or business
might, against their wishes, be compelled,
by the laws of
122
competition in business, to do likewise.
The truth was, Mitchell acknowledged, “that all men are not in
123
fact independent and at liberty to work when they choose.”
It was an easy step, from this premise, for Mitchell to conclude
that the legislature acted within the scope of its police powers in
determining whether the operation of a barbershop was or was not
124
a work of charity or necessity requiring Sunday business hours.
He reached this conclusion by sidestepping the contention,
unremarkable in Joseph Story’s day but controversial in his own,
125
that Christianity formed a part of the common law.
E. The Common Law and the Proper Disposal of the Dead
Larson v. Chase involved a lawsuit occasioned by the
defendant’s unauthorized dissection of the body of the plaintiff’s
126
deceased husband.
The law of burial in nineteenth-century
America was in the process of coming to terms with a rather mixed
set of antecedents. In England, historically, jurisdiction over burial
was divided between the courts of common law and the
ecclesiastical courts. In a statement destined to be repeated many
times by American courts, Sir Edward Coke wrote:
It is to be observed that, in every sepulcher that hath a
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 380, 77 N.W. at 226.
Id.
Id. at 379, 77 N.W. at 226.
Id. at 381, 77 N.W. at 227.
See id.
47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
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monument, two things are to be considered, viz., the
monument, and the sepulture or buriall of the dead. The
buriall of the cadaver (that is caro data vermibus) [flesh
given to worms] is nullius in bonis [a nullity in property],
and belongs to ecclesiasticall cognisance, but as to the
monument, action
is given . . . at the common law for the
127
defacing thereof.
Such a division of competences was workable in nineteenthcentury England, which still maintained a series of ecclesiastical
courts that exercised real coercive powers. It was unworkable,
however, in a United States where ecclesiastical courts could not
exercise the same authority.
Among the most important nineteenth-century decisions on
the subject of burial was the opinion rendered in 1856 by Samuel
Ruggles, a special master appointed by the New York Court of
Chancery to determine the compensation owed to a church and its
congregation for the removal of its cemetery so as to make room
128
for a street widening.
Viewing his role as special master as an
opportunity to remake American burial law, Ruggles placed a series
of limitations on Coke’s teaching. Coke, Ruggles observed, was
motivated by a desire to expand and secure common-law
129
jurisdiction vis à vis the ecclesiastical courts. His etymology of the
word “cadaver” as “flesh given to worms” was incorrect. The Latin
130
did not support such a derivation. The law, furthermore, did not
consign the corpse to the worms but entrusted its care to the
131
Church.
These factors limited Coke’s teaching to its English
context. The American situation was very different.
Ruggles insisted that even though the English common law,
because of its shared jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts, did
not extend legal protection to human remains, the American
courts, given their different circumstances, should extend such
protection:
The establishment of a right so sacred and precious,

127. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
203 (1817) (London: E. & R. Brooke 1797).
128. See In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856).
On the importance of this case, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., “The Body of the Human
Person in American Law: Sacred Receptacle of the Holy Spirit or Marketable
Commodity?” 25-37 (unpublished paper, on file with author).
129. See Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. at 520.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 520-21.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/13

22

Reid: The Creativity of the Common-Law Judge: The Jurisprudence of Will
REID_A UG.10_READYFORFINALPROOF.DOC

2003]

JURISPRUDENCE OF WILLIAM MITCHELL

9/15/2003 5:37 PM

235

ought not to need any judicial precedent. Our courts of
justice should place it at once, where it should
fundamentally rest for ever, on the deepest and most
unerring instincts of human nature; and hold it to be a
self-evident right of humanity, entitled to legal protection,
132
consideration of feeling, decency, and Christian duty.
That Justice Mitchell had this opinion in mind when crafting
133
the Larson opinion is clear from his citation to it. The plaintiff in
Larson, the decedent’s widow, alleged that her late husband’s body
had been “mutilated” and “dissect[ed]” without her permission,
and sought damages on the basis of “mental suffering and nervous
134
shock.” Mitchell ruled in her favor, and in the process produced
a sophisticated, historically grounded analysis of the rights of family
members to the earthly remains of loved ones.
Following Ruggles’ reasoning, Mitchell commenced:
Upon the questions who has the right to the custody of a
dead body for the purpose of burial, and what remedies
such person has to protect that right, the English
common-law authorities are not very helpful or
particularly on point, for the reason that from a very early
date in that country the ecclesiastical
courts assumed
135
exclusive jurisdiction of such matters.
American lawyers and judges, however, because of the absence
136
of ecclesiastical courts, were required to create a new rule. The
creative process was initially a confusing one: “Inclined to follow
the precedents of the English common law, these courts were at
first slow to realize the changed condition of things, and the
consequent necessity that they should take cognizance of these
137
matters and administer remedies as in other analogous cases.”
Mitchell subtly expressed gratitude to unnamed predecessors as he
132.
133.

Id. at 529.
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
Time will not permit, and the occasion does not require, us to
enter into any extended discussion of the history of the law, civil,
common, or ecclesiastical, of burial and the disposition of the
body after death. A quite full and interesting discussion of the
subject will be found in the report of the referee . . . .
Id. at 308, 50 N.W. at 238 (citing Hon. S.B. Ruggles, Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. 503).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 308-09, 50 N.W. at 238. “The repudiation of the ecclesiastical law and
of ecclesiastical courts by the American colonies left the temporal courts the sole
protector of the dead, and of the living in their dead.” Id.
137. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 238.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 13
REID_A UG.10_READYFORFINALPROOF.DOC

236

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

9/15/2003 5:37 PM

[Vol. 30:1

stated what he described as “[t]he general, if not universal
doctrine” that first spouses, then next of kin, should exercise
138
responsibility for the proper burial of the dead.
That Mitchell cited no authority for this statement of the
“general” rule is testimony to his own creative skills. The degree to
which he innovated can be gauged by his invocation of “common
custom,” “sentiment,” and “reason.” “[The rights of spouse or
next-of-kin over the body] is in accordance, not only with common
custom and general sentiment, but also, as we think, with
139
reason.”
Mitchell continued, “this right, is in the nature of a
sacred trust, in the performance of which all are interested who
were allied to the deceased by the ties of family or
140
friendship . . . .”
Mitchell then cited and quoted from Sir Edward Coke’s
141
dictum that there could be no property interest in a corpse. He
reiterated his criticism of Coke’s teaching, noting that it was
142
“severed from its context.”
Further qualifying Coke’s dictum,
Mitchell added:
[I]t will be observed that it is not asserted that no
individual can have any legal interest in a corpse, but
merely that the burial is nullius in bonis, which was legally
true at common law at that time, as the whole matter of
sepulture and custody of the body after burial was within
143
the exclusive cognizance of the ecclesiastical courts.
Mitchell did not want to pursue to its logical conclusion the
proposition that one might have a property interest in a corpse.
Such reasoning might introduce an impermissible degree of
commercialism into an aspect of human life Mitchell clearly
144
considered sacred. Nevertheless, Mitchell asserted, it was the rule
“that those who are entitled to the possession and custody of [the
body] for purposes of decent burial have certain legal rights in it,
145
which the law recognizes and will protect.” Indeed, even in the

138. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 238-39.
139. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 239.
140. Id.
141. Id. Cf. COKE, supra note 127 and accompanying text (providing the
quotation).
142. Larson, 47 Minn. at 310, 50 N.W. at 239.
143. Id.
144. Id. “[I]t may be true still that a dead body is not property in the common
commercial sense of that term . . . .” Id.
145. Id.
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absence of a specific property right, the plaintiff’s “interest” was
146
sufficiently strong to support a claim for damages.
Mitchell then turned his attention to the nature of the
damages the plaintiff was entitled to seek. He conceded that while
it was “elementary that while the law as a general rule only gives
147
compensation for actual injury . . . ,” it is always the case that at
148
least nominal damages will be awarded for the violation of rights.
149
“Every injury imports a damage,” Mitchell declared.
Mitchell then considered whether mental suffering, “as a
distinct element of damage,” might ever be the subject of
150
damages.
Where a legal right has been infringed, Mitchell
expressed a willingness to allow damages for mental distress in the
appropriate circumstances:
‘[F]or the law to furnish redress there must be an act
which, under the circumstances, is wrongful; and it must
take effect upon the person, the property, or some other
legal interest, of the party complaining. Neither one
without the other is sufficient.’ This is but another way of
saying that no action for damages will lie for an act which,
though wrongful, infringed no legal right of the plaintiff,
although it may have caused him mental suffering. But,
where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement of a
legal right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is
the 151
direct, proximate, and natural result of the wrongful
act.
Mitchell then brought the rule he had just enunciated home
to the case at bar: “That mental suffering and injury to the feelings
would be ordinarily the natural and proximate result of knowledge
that the remains of a deceased husband had been mutilated is too
152
plain to admit of argument.” The offense to be compensated,
153
Mitchell concluded, was “the indignity to the dead.”
146. Id. “[W]e think it may be safely laid down as a general rule that an injury to
any right recognized and protected by the common law will, if the direct and
proximate consequence of an actionable wrong, be a subject for compensation.” Id.
147. Id. at 310, 50 N.W. at 239.
148. Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239-40.
152. Id. at 312, 50 N.W. at 240.
153. Id. The result in this case can be distinguished from Francis v. Western Union
Telegraph in that Mitchell concluded in the latter case that the plaintiff lacked a legally
cognizable right to be compensated for the mental anguish caused by the nondelivery
of a telegram. 58 Minn. 252, 59 N.W. 1078 (1894). As Mitchell acerbically put it, he
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IV. CONCLUSION
To appreciate William Mitchell’s creativity, one must recapture
the essence of what it meant to be a common-law judge in late
nineteenth-century America. It was an era that placed great faith in
the possibility that judges, relying upon tradition and precedent,
might fashion novel solutions for the time. As Benjamin Cardozo,
the final and greatest of the common-law judges, described the
process in 1921, it was experimental, embracing the community of
154
judges and lawyers and extending over the generations. Where
“there is no decisive precedent,” where the various parties in the
case before the bench can all present plausible claims, it belongs to
the judge to select among competing principles those best tailored
155
to reach a just result.
“The common law,” Cardozo stressed, “does not work from
pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to
conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is
156
inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars.”
Quoting from Munroe Smith, Cardozo continued:
The rules and principles of case law have never been
treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses,
continually retested in those great laboratories of the law,
the courts of justice. Every new case is an experiment;
and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields157a
result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.
This description fairly matches the sort of method one
discerns at work in Mitchell’s judicial opinions. His concern
preeminently was with the doing of justice in particular cases, even
while remaining solidly grounded within the common-law
tradition.
It would be anachronistic, painfully anachronistic, to try to fit
Mitchell’s jurisprudence within conventional contemporary
did not wish to carve out an exception from a general rule for what he pejoratively
termed “telegraph cases.” Id. at 262, 59 N.W. at 1080. He preferred to follow the
general rule “that damages for mental suffering resulting from a breach of contract is
wholly unknown to and unauthorized by the common law . . . .” Id. Tortious
“indignity to the dead” simply fell into a different category of law governed by
different rules of damages. Larson, 47 Minn. at 312, 50 N.W. at 240.
154. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21-23 (Colonial
Press 1960) (1921).
155. Id. at 21.
156. Id. at 22-23.
157. Id. at 23 (quoting M UNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909)).
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stereotypes of left or right. Clearly, in the course of his long
judicial career, he produced opinions that might be described
variously as progressive or as conservative. He apprehended the
158
coercive powers of large pools of capital on vulnerable workers.
He thus upheld Sunday closing laws as a surrogate for other forms
159
of restricting the numbers of hours worked by employees. But he
endorsed with equal enthusiasm an innovative reading of the
common-law tradition on restraints of trade that allowed for the
160
emergence of monopolies.
Was there a principled coherence to Mitchell’s decisionmaking? Or was he a results-oriented jurisprude, deciding cases on
the bases of hunches that changed over the years, or even from
case to case?
The coherence, it seems, lies in Mitchell’s own fidelity to the
process of common-law, historical reasoning as described by
Cardozo. Mitchell’s invocation of the common law frequently
presaged the fashioning of new rules, intended to improve upon
the received learning, even while remaining faithful to first
principles. Where he departed from the tradition, as he did with
burial law, he did so because the context of the English commonlaw rule simply did not fit American circumstances. And it is this
sort of case, sensitive both to the rule and to the context in which it
was formulated, that characterized the kind of command he had
over his legal sources. Indeed, it can be said that it is precisely in
the mastery of his sources, in his appreciation of the text and
context of his precedents, that Mitchell’s greatness can be
discerned.

158.
159.
160.

See State v. Petit, 74 Minn. 376, 77 N.W. 225 (1898).
See id.
See Nat’l Ben. Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45 Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891).
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